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8 FREIRE v. MATSON NAVIGATION CO. [19 C. (2d) 
-----------------------_. ---.----------
These conclusions make it unnecessary to discuss the point.s 
raised by the respondents. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Ourtis, J., Carter, J., and Tray-
nor, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
11, 1941. Carter, J.,. voted for a rehearing. 
[So F. No. 16587. In Bank. Nov. 14, 1941.] 
JOHN FREIRE, Appellant, v. MATSON NAVIGATION 
COMP ANY (a Oorporation), Respondent. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Remedy Under Act-As Exclusive 
~Injuries Within Scope of Remedy.-The rule of Lab. Code, 
§ 3202, that the TV' orkmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally 
construed in favor of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Acci- ~~ 
dent Commission, is not altered because a plaintiff believes -
that he can establish negligence of his employer and brings a 
civil action for damages. If the injury falls within the scope 
of the act, a proceeding thereunder constitutes his exclusive 
remedy. 
[2] Id.-Remedy Under Act-As Exclusive-Civil Action and Ap-
plication for Compensation.~If an employee is in doubt as 
to whether his injury is sustained in the course of his em-
ployment, he can protect himself against the running of the 
statute of limitations, and be certain that his claim will be 
heard in a proper tribunal, by filing both a civil action in the 
superior court and :an application for compensation before 
the Industrial Accident Commission. 
[3a-3c] Id. - Compensable Injuries - Injuries Received Outside 
Regular Working Hours, etc.-Entering or Leaving Employer's 
Premises-Injuries Sustained on Bulkhead.-Where a steam-
[1] See 27 Cal. Jur. 259, 262; 12 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 4, 5. 
[3J Injuries while entering or leaving place of employment as 
arising out of or in course of employment, note, 39 A. L. R. 424. 
See, also, 27 Cal. Jur. 387. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2J Workmen's Compensation, § 11; 
[3, 4J Workmen's Compensation, § 102; [5J Workmen's Compen-
sation, § 93. 
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ship company employee reporting for work was struck by a 
company car as he emerged from a taxicab which had stopped 
on a paved bulkhead adjoining the company's premises, and 
said bulkhead constituted the only practical means of reach-
ing his place of employment, his injuries were sustained in 
the course of his employment, and it was immaterial that 
the accident happened fifteen minutes before he was to begin 
work. 
[4] Id.-Compensable Injuries-Injuries Received Outside Regular 
Working Hours, etc.-Entering or Leaving Employer's Prem-
ises-Existence of Special Risk.-While an employee is 
ordinarily not entitled to compensation for injuries sustained 
in going to or departing from work, he if; entitled to compen-
sation, if the employment creates a special risk, for injuries 
sustained within the field of that risk. Such a risk may 
attend the employee as soon as he enters the employer's 
premises or the necessary means of access thereto, even when 
the latter is not under the employer's control or management. 
[5] ld.-Compensable Injuries-Perils Peculiar to Employment-
Risks of Streets and Travel-Danger to General Public.-
The facts that an accident happens npon a public road, and the 
danger is one to which the general public is likewise ex-
posed, do not preclude the existence of a causal relation-
ship between the accident and the employment if the danger 
is one to which the enlployee, by reason of and in connection 
with his employment, is subjected peculiarly or to an ab-
normal degree. 
APPEAL from a jUdgment of the Superior Oourt of the 
City and County of San Francisco. 1.' M. Golden, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
Carl W. v\!ynkoop and Philander B. Beadle for Appellant. 
Hoge, Pelton & Gunther and A. Dal 'rhomson for Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff was employed as a janitor upon 
a steamship owned and operated by defendant company. He 
did not reside on the ship when it was moored, but reported 
regularly for duty at 8 a. m. at the steward's office on the 
vessel. On November 7, 1938, about 7 :45 a. m., he arrived 
[5 J Injury to employee while in street in front of employer's 
pr~mises when going to or coming from work, note, 85 A. L. R. 97. 
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in a taxicab at pier 32 in San Francisco, where the ship was 
moored. The taxicab came to a stop on the bulkhead in front 
of the pier and plaintiff opened the door to get out. As he 
stepped upon the running board, an automobile owned by 
defendant company and driven by one of its employees in 
the scope of his employment, backed into the side of the 
taxicab, crushing plaintiff's foot. Plaintiff brought an action 
for damages in the superior court, contending that the in-
jury occurred while he was going to work and therefore, 
under the going and coming rule, did not arise out of or 
occur in the course of his employment. Defendant contends 
that the plaintiff sustained the injury within the zone of 
employment and that his sole remedy lies under the W ork-
men's Compensation Act, with exclusive jurisdiction in the 
Industrial Accident Commission. The trial court directed 
a verdict for defendant company and plaintiff appeals from 
the judgment entered thereon. 
[1] The Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally 
construed in favor of jurisdiction in the commission with the 
purpose of extending the benefits of the act for the protec-
tion of persons injured in the course of their employment. 
(Labor C.ode, sec. 3202; Fenton v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
44 Cal. App. (2d) 379, 382 [112 Pac. (2d) 763].) The rule 
is not altered because a plaintiff believes that he can estab-
lish negligence on the part of his employer and brings a 
civil suit for damages. If the injury falls within the scope 
of the act, a proceeding thereunder constitutes his exclusive 
remedy. (Labor Code, sec. 3601; see cases cited in 27 Cal. 
Jur. 262, and 12 Cal. Jur. Ten-Year Supp. 4, 5.) [2] If an 
employee is in doubt whether or not his injury is sustained 
in the course' of his employment, he can protect himself against 
the running of the statute of limitations, and be certain that 
his claim will be heard in the proper tribunal, by filing both 
a 'civil action in the superior court and an application for 
compensation before the commission. (Schumacker v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com., 46 Cal. App. (2d) 95 [115 Pac. (2d) 571].) 
[Sa] The question whether plaintiff's injury arose out of 
and in the course of his employment turns upon the relation of 
the bulkhea.d upon which the accident occurred to plaintiff's 
place of employment. The bulkhead is a strip of pavement 
approximately 62 feet wide that lies between the public 
street known as the Embarcadero on the west and the piers 
~ 
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and buildinb''l on the east. The State Board of Harbor Com-
missioners have assigned to defendant company the use of 
piers 30 and 32, inclusive of the building thereon and the 
premises up to the bulkhead upon which the pier entrances 
face, but not inclusive of the bulkhead. While the bulkhead 
is under the control and management of the Harbor Com-
mission, it constitutes the only means of reaching the pier, 
where the ship was moored, from the Embarcadero. That 
part of the bulkhead adjoining the premises assigned to de-
fendant company appears to be used to a considerable extent 
for the purposes of the company. Thus, it serves to facili-
tate the handling of cargoes during periods of congestion and 
is used by persons having business with the company as a 
thoroughfare for their trucks, drays, and other vehicles, and 
by stevedores, seamen, passengers and visitors as a parking 
place. Defendant employs a large number of special officers 
who, in the course of their duties, control traffic on the 
bulkhead and keep the entrances to the piers clear. The 
gate to the piers opens at eight 0 'clock, and those who arrive 
earlier must wait upon the bulkhead until that time. On the 
morning of the accident, the bulkhead was crowded with 
stevedores and other employees of defendant company who 
were waiting for the gate to open. The vehicles that were 
on the bulkhead at the time were there for the most part in 
connection with company business. 
[4] It is well settled that while an employee is ordinarily 
not entitled to workmen's compensation for an injury sus-
tained in going to or departing from work, he is entitled to 
compensation, if the employment creates a special risk, for in-
juries sustained within the field of that risk. Such a risk may 
attend the employee as soon as he enters the employer's 
premises or the necessary means of access thereto, even when 
the latter is not under the employer's control or manage-
ment. (Starr Piano Co. v. Ind,ustrial Ace. Com., 181 Cal. 
433 [184 Pac. 860] ; J'ndson Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
181 Cal. 300 [184 Pac. 1]; Globe Indemnity Co. v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com.) 208 Cal. 715, 719 [284 Pac. 661J. See 
lJIlakins v. Industrial Ace. Com., 198 Cal. 698, 701 [247 Pac. 
202, 49 A. L. R. 411] ; Jimeson v. Industrial Ace. Com., 23 
Cal. App. (2d) 634, 638, 639 [73 Pac. (2d) 1238] ; Cromwell 
v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 102 Cal. App. 499, 502 [283 Pac. 
375] ; 23 Cal. L. Rev. 366, 367.) 
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: [3b] It is evident fr0In, the facts in the instant case that 
the bulkhead is "the means of access" to the pier "required 
and authorized by the company, " that it is "in fact, 'dominant 
as to user in the employer, servient to its purpose, and in-
t~mately associated with its plant as a part of its necessary 
establishment." (Judson Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 
supra, p. 301.) In Judson 1J.ffg. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 
supra, the employee was killed while walking on a path 
leading from the end of a public street to the gate of his 
employer's factory. The path was on the railroad right of 
way and was neither owned nor controlled by the employer, 
but the court awarded compensation upon the grounds that 
it was the necessary 'means of access to. the employer's prem-
ises, required by the employer and contemplated in the em-
ployment, and that as between the employer and his employees 
it was in practice a part of the employer's plant. The only 
difference of note between the path in the Judson case and 
the bulkhead in the instant case is that the first was owned 
by a private third party while the latter is public property. 
Plaintiff contends that since, the bulkhead is public prop- , 
erty, he encountered no more hazard there than would any'" 
member of the public, that he was exposed to no special hazard 
incidental to his employment. [5] The facts that an acci-
dent happens upon a public road and that the danger is one 
to which the general public is likewise exposed, however, do 
not preclude the existence of a causal relationship between 
the accident and the employment if the danger is one to 
which the employee, by reason of and in connection with his 
employmerit, is subjected peculiarly or to an abnormal de-
gree. (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc; 
Oom., 194 Cal. 28, 31 [227 Pac. 168] ; Ct"dahy Packing 00. 
v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418 [44 Sup. Ct. 153, 68 L. Ed. 
366].) In State Oompensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial 
Acc. Com., supra, the employee was awarded compensation 
for an injury sustained on a public sidewalk outside the 
entrance to her employer's premises. The entrance was one 
that she was required to use and the injury directly resulted 
from the slippery condition of this entrance and the adjoining 
runway over the sidewalk, caused by the acts of other em-
ployees. ,In Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, supra, the 
Supreme Court of the United States held thRt a causal rela-
tionship couid be iOUlid between the employme.n.t ,and t~e 
Nov. 1941.] FREIRE V.MATSON NAVIGATION Co. 
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death of an employee killed while crossing a railroad track 
on a pUblic road that constituted the customary and only 
practical way of reaching the employer's plant. (See, also, 
cases cited in note, 85 A. L. R. 97. Cf. Jimeson v. Indtlstrial 
Ace. Com., supra, p. 638.) 
[3e] In the instant-case the plaintiff by reason of his em-
ployment was subjected to the risks arising on the bulkhead 
peculiarly and to an abnormal degree. At the time of his 
injury plaintiff was upon the bulkhead solely in the line of 
his duty as an employee. (See Judson Mfg. Co. v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com., S1l,pra, p. 302.) He was obliged to be there 
on the morning of the accident before eight 0 'clock in readi-
ness to go on the pier and thence to his ship at that time. 
The injury to plaintiff occurred upon the only praetical 
means of access to the employer's premises. The hazard 
to which he was subjected when he arrived upon the bulk-
head was created by his employer, its agents and those with 
whom it did business. (See State Compensation Ins. F1md 
v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra.) Under these circumstances, 
the hazard was one directly connected with the employment 
and, under the authority of the cases cited, the injury was 
one arising out of and in the course of plaintiff's employment. 
The fact that the accident happened some minutes before 
plaintiff was to begin work is immaterial. (Judson Mfg. Co. 
v. Industrial Acc. Oom., supra. See Oromwell v. Los Angeles 
Ry. Corp., supra.) "The employment contemplated his entry 
upon and departure from the premises as much as it con-
templated his working there, and must include a reasonable 
interval of time for that purpose." (Cudahy Packing 00. 
v. Parramore, supra, p. 426.) 
The plaintiff's remedy, therefore, is under the Workmen'~ 
Compensation Act and the judgment from which plaintiff 
appeals is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
11, 1941. C.urtis, J., and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. 
